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Note to preceed the re-printed Introduction to Philosophical Essays on Freud
The Introduction  to Philosophical  Essays on Freud was  written to deadline
over  a decade  ago, and the  flaws in  my statements of  both philosophical
ideas  and  clinical descriptions  are  more  glaring with  time. Still  the
account  seems worth  going on with,  and the  essay remains the  only short
philosophical introduction  to these  topics. I have revised  and extended a
number  of  ideas  in  subsequent  articles,  and also  written  a  separate
discussion  of  the  work  of Melanie  Klein,  which  is  treated mainly  in
footnotes. These developments flow  fairly naturally from the text here, and
are noted in the comments on Johnston which follow.
Irrationality,  Interpretation  and  Division: Comments  on Mark  Johnston's
Essay
A main theme of the Introduction to Philosophical Essays on Freud was that a
significant part  of Freud's  thinking could be  understood in terms  of the
notion of  wishfulfilment, or wishfulfilling phantasy;  and that this should
be  regarded not  as intentional  action, but  rather as  a form  of wishful
thinking  or imagining,  in  which a  wish or  desire causes  an imaginative
representation of its fulfilment,  which is experience- or belief-like. Such
a causal  sequence has  a pattern, which it  will be useful to  set out more
explicitly, so that it  can be compared with others. Letting the agent be A,
and abbreviating the notion  of belief- or experience-like representation by
'b-rep', we can write the pattern as
(1) A's desire that P -[causes]-> A's b-rep that P
Simple instances  of this pattern were the case in which  (as we can put it)
Freud's desire that he  drink causes his dream that he is drinking (xx), and
also the symptom of  the unembarrassed girl (xi), caused, there seems reason
to  say,  by an  underlying  desire which  was  sexual. In  these cases  the
imaginative representation  has a content which is  easy to grasp. Hence the
content of the underlying  causally active desire (or wish) can be read from
its  effect in  accord  with (1),  which serves  as a  sort of  template for
interpretation of this kind.
In more complex instances  -- such as the dream of not giving a supper party
with smoked  salmon (xx),  or again the  obsessional symptom of  showing the
maid the spot (xxi)  -- the representational content is less manifest. Where
this is  so the content must  be brought more fully to  light, by way of the
free  associations of  the  patient or  dreamer, before  the pattern  can be
applied. Still  the pattern of even very  complex examples remains simple in
form, and has been traced in empirical material in a vast range of instances
and  cases, often  in  remarkable detail.  So (1)  can be  seen as  having a
pervasive role  in psychology, despite both  its internal simplicity and the
interpretive complexity through which some of its instances are disclosed.
Although Mark Johnston's 'Self-Deception and the Nature of the Mind' was not
written with these claims  in mind, it seems at least in part to accord with
them. In  particular, Johnston independently emphasizes  the role of wishful
thought,  and  also  argues  that this  should  be  understood as  involving
causation which is non-rational and non-intentional, and which holds between
desire and something like  belief. He describes the causal role of desire in
such  cases  in terms  of  'mental tropism',  and  speaks of  the result  as
'quasi-belief', which seems close  to the idea of belief-like representation
above; and he also  takes the tropistic causation of quasi-belief to be very
common. Johnston  also indicates  in passing that  he too applies,  or would
apply, this  account, not  only to self-deception,  but also to  a number of
phenomena described in psychoanalysis: division, denial, repression, removal
of affect, and wishful perception and memory. Thus we seem to agree on these
main points,  and also  to share a  common perspective on  the philosophical
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exposition of psychoanalytic theory.
Johnston also  sets out a number  of other lines of  argument. He holds, for
example,  that  the commonness  of  wishful  tropism contradicts  Davidson's
intepretive approach  to the mind;  and he argues, as  against both Davidson
and Pears,  that a  tropistic account of  self-deception avoids difficulties
inherent in  their homuncular  ones. Despite the  interest and force  of the
arguments  which  Johnston  puts  foreward,  these conclusions  seem  to  me
premature,  and to  require serious  qualification. In  what follows  I will
concentrate on these points  of disagreement, and especially as they bear on
the philosophical understanding of  psychoanalysis, which I shall discuss in
as much  detail as space permits.  The reader should bear  in mind, however,
that  this  was not  Johnston's  main  topic, and  hence  that emphases  and
additions in  my discussion are  not meant to indicate  shortcomings in his.
II
Let  us  first  take  Johnston's critique  of  Davidson,  whose approach  to
commonsense  psychology I  was  attempting to  extend to  psychoanalysis. As
Johnston observes (p 80),  Davidson says in 'The Paradoxes of Irrationality'
that
               the  only clear  pattern of  explanation that applies  to the
               mental...demands that [a] cause  be more than a candidate for
               being a reason; it must be a reason [for what it causes]
Now plainly  Johnston and I disagree  with Davidson on this  point, since we
both  take  the  causal   pattern  of  wishfulfilment  above  to  be  clear,
explanatory and widely applicable to the mental. Since Davidson is also well
aware of this pattern, and indeed calls it 'a model for the simplest form of
irrationality',  I have  thought  the statement  above a  slip,  with little
bearing  on   his  main  views.  Johnston,   however,  regards  it  as  more
consequential. He writes that
               The existence and ubiquity of mental tropisms whose relata to
               not stand  in any  rational relation falsifies a  view of the
               mental which  is gaining currency. This  interpretive view of
               mental states and events has it that there is nothing more to
               being in  a mental  state or undergoing a  mental change than
               being  apt to  have that  state or  change attributed  to one
               within an  adequate interpretive  theory, i.e. a  theory that
               take's  one's   behaviour  (including  speech  behaviour)  as
               evidence  and  develops  under  the  holistic  constraint  of
               constructing  much of  that  behaviour as  intentional action
               caused  by  rationalizing  beliefs  and desires  that  it  is
               reasonable to suppose the  subject has, given his environment
               and basic drives (66).
Davidson's approach can rightly be called interpretive, but this description
does not do it justice. Thus it is doubtful that according to Davidson there
is 'nothing  more to being in a mental state  or undergoing a mental change'
than being  apt to  have that state  or change interpretively  ascribed. For
Davidson holds  that mental events are  identical with physical events, that
mental  properties  (predicates)  supervene on  physical  ones,  and that  a
person's  psychological dispositions  and abilities, which  include desires,
beliefs and  the capacity  to speak and  act intentionally, are  realized or
'constituted'  by 'physical  state[s],  largely centered  in the  brain'. In
consequence  Davidson notes  that in  identifying a  physical event  with an
action, say, we must  'be sure that the causal history of the physical event
includes events  or states  identical with the desires  and cognitive states
that  yield  a  psychological  explanation  of the  action.'  Thus  Davidson
explicitly  constrains the  role  of interpretation  in his  account  of the
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mental by  a series of notions  -- identity, supervenience, and constitution
or  realization -- which  relate the mental  to the  physical, and so  as to
ensure that all causal  relations of the mental have an appropriate physical
realization 'centered in the  brain'. The role of these physical constraints
has not  been fully  articulated, but their existence  contradicts a literal
reading of Johnston's 'nothing more' above.
As is well known, Davidson also argues that no strict law -- no law which is
sharp and exceptionless, and which contains no ineliminable caveats, ceteris
paribus clauses,  or the like --  holds between a particular  type of desire
and any type of constituting state or mechanism in the brain. Thus, e.g. the
type  desire to have coffee with milk cannot  be strictly connected with any
neural mechanism  which can  be precisely specified in  physical terms. This
can be  seen as a direct  consequnce of his emphasis  on interpretation. The
idea would be that  if we hold that the ascription of a desire is ultimately
answerable to  the interpretive explanation of  behaviour, then we cannot at
the  same time  hold that  the desire  is related  by a  strict law  to some
well-defined  physical mechanism.  For  the presence  or absence  of  such a
mechanism would be a  clear physiological fact, and this, by the strict law,
would  fix  the presence  or  absence  of the  desire  in all  nomologically
possible circumstances. So to hold that there is such a mechanism-specifying
law would be (implicitly) to take the ascription of the desire as answerable
to a specific mechanism rather than to the explanation of behaviour.
In envisaging  the existence of  psychophysical laws we tend  to assume that
everything will come out  in perfect harmony: that there will be no conflict
between  ascribing  the  desire  on the  basis  of  its supposedly  lawfully
constituting physical  state or mechanism, and ascribing  it on the basis of
interpretation; nor any uncertainty,  given the mechanism, as to whether the
desire  is actually  there.  This, however,  misses the  point of  the above
argument, which is that the existence of strict law should actually preclude
the  empirical  possibility of  this  kind  of disharmony.  In holding  that
ascriptions  are  ultimately answerable  to  considerations of  interpretive
psychological  explanation  we  show   that  we  do  not  assume  that  this
possibility  is  foreclosed,  and  hold that  the  final  verdict lies  with
interpretation. This, however, is the position for which Davidson argues.
Another argument may bring out the nature and plausibility of this position,
and  will also  serve  to introduce  some  further matters  relevant to  the
discussion. Let  us reflect on our practice  of describing motives, which we
schematize  by speaking  of the  desire that  P, the  belief that Q,  and so
forth. In  this 'P' and 'Q'  stand for, or can  be replaced by, sentences of
natural language.  We understand  these sentences, in  turn, as true  in the
worldly  conditions or situations  which they  specify, and hence  in accord
with a semantic pattern which we can indicate by
(2) 'P' is true just if P
This schematic pattern is  supposed to cover our systematic understanding of
the  truth-conditions of  indefinitely many  sentences of our  language, and
hence to  describe a  vast amount of  information relating language  and the
world  --  which, of  course,  it  does only  very  roughly indeed.  Equally
schematically, the  conditions in which we take the  sentence 'P' to be true
are  also those  in which  we take the  desire that  P to be  satisfied, the
belief that P to be verified, the hope or fear that P to be realized, and so
on. Thus to take our example: when we say that Freud desired that he (Freud)
drink, we use the sentence 'he (Freud) drink[s]' to describe Freud's desire;
in accord  with pattern (2), we take 'he (Freud) drinks'  to be true just if
Freud  drinks; this,  therefore,  we also  take  as the  situation in  which
Freud's  desire would  be  satisfied. So  in accord  with  (1), this  is the
situation  which Freud  b-reps  as obtaining,  in dreaming  that  he (Freud)
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drinks.  The  artificiality in  these  phrasings reflects  something of  the
roughness in  our specification of the  relevant patterns; but the existence
of such patterns seems clear.
Our  commonsense  practice is  thus  to  recycle our  worldly sentences,  to
describe the mind in its engagement with the world; and we do this in such a
way  as  to enable  us  to understand  this  engagement in  accord with  our
understanding of  the sentences  themselves. This mode of  description is at
once semantic and causal:  for in employing it we use the semantic relations
of our  motive-describing sentences  to map causal  relations between motive
and motive, and motives and the world. We take it, for example, that desires
serve to bring about  (cause) the semantically specified conditions in which
they are  satisfied. This shows in a further pattern,  which we can write as
follows:
(3) A's desire that P -[causes]-> P
This is  a pattern  we find in  successful rational action, such  as that in
which Freud desire is  that he drink, and this brings it about (causes) that
he drinks. This form, incidentally, is common to other kinds of teleological
explanation, which  postulate representations of goals  which operate within
the systems of which  they are part to bring about (cause) those goals. What
is unique about explanation  by desires is not this basic teleological form,
but rather that the  system in which goals (desires) are represented has the
expressive and computational power  of human language (cf the pervasive role
of (2)  above). Also, of course, this pattern can  still be applied when the
connection between  desire and situation is  mediated by further desires and
beliefs, as discussed below.
Similarly,  we  hold that  beliefs  serve  to register  (be  caused by)  the
situations which verify them. This gives the pattern
(4) P -[causes]-> A's belief that P
This pattern  is also widespread: we  take it, for example,  that when Freud
drinks, this brings it  about that he believes that he drinks; and something
like this  is characteristic  of intentional actions  generally. Again, this
pattern  is rational,  since it  is that  of belief  which is both  true and
justified  by the  presence of  a kind  of causal  relation which  makes for
knowledge. Like  (3), this pattern extends to  cases in which the connection
between belief and situation  is mediated, e.g. by further belief or theory.
Indeed it  might be  said that the  point of theory  is to  make our beliefs
sensitive to the world  as in (4), so that our desires can  work in it as in
(3).
We also  use deductive  semantic relations between sentence  and sentence to
map causal relations between  motive and motive. In general, we take it that
beliefs cause beliefs in  accord with logical patterns (not specified here).
Also we apply such patterns to desires, for example in holding that an agent
who  desires that  Q and  believes that if  P then  Q thereby has  reason to
desire   that  P.  This   is  the   causal  pattern  of   practical  reason:
(5) A's  desire that  Q and belief that  if P then Q  -[causes]-> A's desire
that P
Here the pattern of motive-specifying sentences, read from right to left, is
that of modus  ponens. This shows that if the belief in the pattern is true,
then satisfying  the derived  desire must also  satisfy the initial  one, so
that an  agent who forms or  modifies motives in accord  with the pattern is
thus far rational.
(3) and (4) relate  motives described by sentences to the worldly situations
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in which those sentences  are true, and so in effect incorporate (2); so the
patterns  with which  we  are dealing  are  at once  semantic, rational  and
causal. They illustrate how  our commonsense system of understanding persons
co-ordinates norms  of language, as partly specified  in (2), with norms for
the working of motive,  as specified in (3) - (5); so that the understanding
of language,  and that of motive in rational  action, form a hermeneutic and
causal unity. Hence, arguably,  the basic form of application of this system
is in  the interpretation of persons as  rational, i.e. as thinking, acting,
and speaking in accord  with such norms, and thus in accord with schema like
(2) - (5).
Such interpretation can be  represented as a process in which an interpreter
explains  sequences  of an  interpretee's  bodily  movements as  intentional
actions,  motivated by  desires and  beliefs with  appropriate environmental
conditions  of  truth,  satisfaction,  and  the rest,  where  this  includes
interpreting the  making of strings of sounds  as the utterance of sentences
with particular  environmental conditions of truth.  In this the interpreter
in effect maps sentences of his or her own language on to both the behaviour
of  the interpretee  and the  environment shared  by them both,  and thereby
systematically   links  the   interpretee's   behaviour  with   that  common
environment.
In the simplest case, in which the interpretee happens to use the same words
and sentences as the interpreter, and in the same way, interpretation can at
least partly be understood  in terms of the repeated application of patterns
like  (2) -  (5); for in  the idealized  situation in which  the interpretee
judges accurately and so acts successfully, the interpreter can always use a
single  sentence, or  closely  related sentences,  to characterize  both the
interpretee's belief  and its object, both  his desire and its satisfaction,
and both his sentence and its meaning. Such overlapping characterization, in
turn, registers that the causal relations which hold among the interpretee's
motives and the environment generally are as they should be, and this is the
simplest case  of the  kind of pattern  of coherence which  marks successful
psychological explanation. The interpreter's  own use of language, including
that  in  interpretation,  is  also  to  be  understood  as  construable  by
interpretation, and  hence answerable to the norms  imposed in the course of
it, in the same  way as the interpretee's. So an interpretive view offers us
an account of the  content and causal role of both motives and sentences, as
fixed in harmony through the applicability of interpretive teleological (and
causal) explanation of behaviour.
It seems,  therefore, that interpretive patterns  such as those indicated in
(2)  - (5)  have an  epistemic status  which is  worth noting.  We interpret
behaviour in  accord with them naturally,  and hence spontaneously, rapidly,
and continually.  In this  sense we use  such patterns more  frequently, and
rely  on them  more  deeply, than  any generalizations  of science.  (But of
course we have no need to realize that this is so.) We apparently learn such
patterns together with  language, so that their use is in a  sense a priori.
Also, however, we find  them actually instantiated, and hence supported in a
way which  is both  empirical and  a posteriori, in  instances of successful
interpretive understanding too dense and numerous to register.
Patterns of  this kind are also predictive.  For example when an interpreter
takes it  that an  interpretee is acting, or  is going to act,  on a certain
desire,  the  interpreter's description  of  the  desire by  a sentence  'P'
constitutes a prediction in  accord with (3). The interpreter's description,
that is,  can be  regarded as an  hypothesis, which is framed  and tested by
successive uses  of the same  sentence: the first use  describes the motive,
and the second the action or situation which this motive should bring about.
(Roughly, the  hypothesis is confirmed if the  sentence used to describe the
desire also serves to describe the action or situation caused by the desire,
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and  disconfirmed  if  not;  hence, as  stressed  in  the introduction,  the
hypothesis tends  to be confirmed by  sentential coherence, and disconfirmed
by its absence.) Something analogous also holds in instances of (1), (4) and
(5); so that uses  of these patterns constitute a system which is subject to
a variety  of predictive tests, each framed by the  use of a single sentence
and confirmed or disconfirmed by further uses of that sentence, and hence by
instances  of  descriptive (interpretive)  coherence,  or lack  of it.  More
generally,  success  in interpretation  enables  us to  achieve and  predict
further success of the same kind. So past use of such patterns gives us good
reason to  count on  finding them instantiated  in the future,  and on their
continuing to  locate the same sorts of  motives that they have consistently
specified so far.
Part of  the argument  of the introduction  -- that involving  the 'strongly
predictive   guiding  principle[s]   of   interpretation',  of   action  and
wishfulfilment sketched  at xxvi ff  -- can be represented  as claiming that
(1)  has acquired  an  empirical status  akin to  that  of (3),  through the
psychoanalytic  interpretation  of  episodes  in  behaviour  which  had  not
previously been  observed or  understood; and that  in this use  (1) and (3)
tend in  fact to home in on the same  recently discovered but basic motives.
Uses of (1) and  (3) thus interact in psychoanalytic practice to support one
another  in  an extension  of  commonsense psychology  which is  potentially
sound, cumulative, and radical. Sound, because the extending interpretations
cohere both with the  basic patterns, and also with one another, in locating
very  many supporting instances  for the  relevant values of  P; cumulative,
because each discovery of the operation of new motives naturally facilitates
the  discovery  of  others;   and  radical,  because  the  extension  offers
significantly deeper, fuller, and  more coherent explanations of actions and
wishfulfilments generally,  and by reference to  motives which, in the main,
had  not previously  been contemplated. This  view still  seems to me  to be
mainly   correct,  but   will  receive   some  revision  in   what  follows.
We  have  seen  that  (2)  -  (5)  can  be  taken to  describe  patterns  of
psychological  dispositions --  to link  sentence with  situation, situation
with motive, and motive with motive -- which accord with causal and semantic
norms. Hence interpretation in accord with such patterns represents the mind
of  the interpretee  as rational,  and as  a semantic engine,  whose inputs,
working,  and output  are  registered in  terms of  belief, reason,  and the
satisfaction of desire. The  mechanism which realizes such dispositions, and
hence the  engine which we thus indirectly  describe, is the nervous system,
and in  particular the brain. Patricia Churchland  takes the aim of research
in computational neurophysiology to be that of mapping the 'phase-spaces' --
the 'as  the world  presents itself' space,  and the 'as my  body should be'
space --  which the working brain relates. This, it  seems, is also the task
which commonsense psychology already partly performs, via the use of natural
language, in describing persons in terms of patterns like (2) - (5).
Such  causal-semantic  description  of   motives  is  like  our  commonsense
description of a photograph,  which doesn't describe the picture chemically,
say, but rather in  terms of the objects or persons in the environment which
are  represented  in it,  and  which played  a  certain causal  role in  its
production.  We assume  that  the look  of  a photograph  supervenes on  its
intrinsic  physical  state,  and  also  that  this state  can  be  explained
causally,  by  reference  to  the  objects  or situations  specified  in  an
environmental   description   and  the   physical   processes  involved   in
photography. Environmental and intrinsic  descriptions of photographs are in
a clear  sense descriptions  of the same things  (the same representations).
They  are  both useful,  and  further  scientific inquiry  can specify  them
further  and  relate  them  in  greater  detail;  and  since  they  are  not
competitors no  sensible person who knew their  uses could want to eliminate
either. Also  we know that the same  environment can photograph in different
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ways, and  different environments in the  same way, so we  take it that such
descriptions will not be strictly related type by type.
This situation  seems entirely unproblematic in  the case of representations
like photographs.  So if  we take the desire  or belief that P  to involve a
neural  representation of  the  situation P,  the parallel  claim  should be
equally  acceptable. This,  however, is  the claim  that there is  no strict
correlation  between psychological  descriptions ( that P  descriptions) and
intrinsic physical descriptions of representational mental states. We can be
sure  that  an  environmental   description  of  a  representation  will  be
systematically   connected   with  intrinsic   descriptions   of  the   same
representation, when  we can  frame them. But  describing representations in
terms of  a complex causal role vis-a-vis  the environment is very different
from describing  them intrinsically. Knowing the  working of these two forms
of  description --  and in  particular knowing  that description  via causal
connection with  the environment invariably introduces  a degree of slack --
we can see that their correlation should not be strict.
Both this argument and  that derived from Davidson above turn on the notions
of  interpretation  and  strictness.  States  which  are  described  by  the
interpretive   specification   of   environmental   conditions   of   truth,
satisfaction, and the like will not be strictly related to specific internal
mechanisms.  As the  analogy with  photographs suggests, however,  the slack
need not  be great. Thus it is consistent with  the letter of such arguments
that  there there  should be something  like a  language of thought,  with a
specific 'syntactic'  neural mechanism for each desire  or belief -- so long
as this  syntax was,  say, ineliminably rough, or  susceptible to ambiguity,
local  variation,  or  the   like.  Still  acknowledgment  of  the  role  of
interpretation suggests something more radical. As a connectionist might put
the point,  it seems that we should take desires  and beliefs as realized by
neural networks  which may vary from person to person,  or, even in the same
person, from  time to time. This also allows  that the network realizing one
desire  or ability  can realize  others, so  that there  would be  no strict
pairing of distinct parts  of the network, or of distinct neural structures,
with distinct  desires or beliefs. This is  not part of Davidson's argument,
but  fits with  his  emphasis on  the interconnection  of beliefs  and other
attitudes with content. For  on this picture -- a version of which was urged
at  xv,  footnote 9  --  the agent's  system  of motives,  and their  neural
realization, would match not item by item, but rather only net by net.
Johnston goes on to claim that
               ...On this  conception, when  we attribute a  mental state to
               another,  we are  not locating  within him  an instance  of a
               mental  natural kind  or  property that  as such  enters into
               characteristic causal  relations in accord with nonaccidental
               psychological or psychophysical  regularities. On the view in
               question  there are  no natural  mental properties and  so no
               lawlike   psychological   or   psychophysical   regularities.
               Instead, attributions of mental states and changes have point
               only  within  a whole  pattern  of reason-explanations,  i.e.
               explanations  that exhibit  the subject  as a  rational agent
               pursuing what  is reasonable from his  point of view. Fitting
               into a pattern of reason-explanations that serve to interpret
               their subject is thus a constitutive condition of something's
               being  a  mental attribution.  More,  there can  be no  other
               content to  the idea that something  is a mental attribution.
               In this sense, rationality  is constitutive and exhaustive of
               the mental (66).
Thus,   as  Johnston   spells  out   his  refutation  of   Davidson's  view:
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               ...wishful  and  self-deceptive thought  seems  to involve  a
               characteristic and  explanatory causal connection between the
               desire  that  p and  the belief  that  p, but  an explanatory
               connection which  is not  a rational connection.  The anxious
               desire that p  is not a reason to believe that p. Because the
               interpretive view counts rationality as both constitutive and
               exhaustive of the mental,  it has trouble finding a place for
               the very possibility of a mental state, anxious desire, which
               characteristically has irrational mental consequences (80).
Again,  however,  Johnston's remarks  do  not  characterize Davidson's  view
correctly. Since  Davidson's argument is directed  only against strict laws,
it is  consistent with a range  of claims about realization.  And even if we
take the radical alternative sketched above, it remains false to say that we
are  not, in  attributing a  mental state  to another, locating  within that
other something  which 'as such enters  into characteristic causal relations
in accord with non-accidental psychological or psychophysical regularities.'
For on any such  view mental states like desires and beliefs still enter 'as
such'   into   characteristic  causal   relations,   and   in  accord   with
non-accidental psychological  regularities. Such states involve dispositions
and  Davidson suggests that  'the laws  implicit in reason  explanations are
simply the  generalizations implied by the  attributions of dispositions' of
this kind.  The attribution  of dispositions (or  causal powers, capacities,
etc.) is clearly that of non-accidental generalizations. To ascribe a desire
is to attribute, among other things, a disposition to produce a situation in
which  the  desire  is   satisfied.  So  here  the  relevant  non-accidental
psychological regularity  is that specified in (3)  above. (And of course we
also locate the mechanism which realizes the disposition 'within' the person
to whom we ascribe  the desire.) This, however, seems a companion pattern to
the  version of (1)  which Johnston  also describes. Davidson's  slip apart,
these  patterns seem  too  alike in  role  and content  to be  distinguished
further to his disadvantage, despite the fact that (3) is rational while (1)
is not.
As  noted, Davidson has  stressed that  such generalization over  desire and
action as we find in (3) is not strict. The predictive use of (3) considered
above, for  example, involves a claim that an agent  is acting, or will act,
on a specified desire. But the mere fact that someone has a desire -- even a
strong desire -- does  not itself render action on that desire interestingly
probable. Countervailing  desires may  usually, or invariably,  be stronger,
and for many desires we may know this in advance. Davidson gives the example
of 'the ratio of  actual adultries to the adultries which the Bible says are
committed  in  the  heart'; and  despite  their  strength, persistence,  and
pervasive influence, the ratio  for intentional action on Oedipal desires is
more  infinitesimal yet.  In  these cases  we both  accept that  the desires
involve dispositions  specified in terms  of action and also  hold that such
action is very unlikely; that is, we take the desires to show themselves via
(1) rather than (3).  Also, as Davidson emphasizes, we generally have no way
of specifying  in advance of action  which desires -- which  values for P in
(3) -- will be  strongest at a given time, or which will get acted in accord
with. This point also  holds for (1); and the fact that both generalizations
have the same antecedant,  desire, suggests that their lack of strictness is
comparable.
This lack is no sign that we cannot interpret actions and wishfulfilments in
accord  with   these  patterns  accurately  and   efficiently.  Our  natural
interpretive abilities  would seem to have arisen  because they enable us to
extract information from the behaviour of others (cf xix), and hence to have
evolved  together  with the  forms  of  behaviour which  they  enable us  to
understand.  The patterns  are thus  made for  the sequences of  behavior on
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which  they  operate,  and  vice-versa.  The cognitive  task  of  extracting
information from  such behaviour is not solely that  of saying ahead of time
what  the  sequences  will  be;  the  point  is  not  just to   predict  the
information-bearing  specifics,  but  rather  to  use  them,  and hence  the
information they  carry, for further purposes  (which may include prediction
of other things). Thus  the lack of predictive strictness in the patterns is
no  fault, but  rather a  mark of their  fitness to  the task we  perform in
accord with them.
Moreover, the  pattern of the working of  desire in successful action should
not be seen as distinct from that shown in wishfulfilment. Both, rather, are
implicit  together in  rational  action itself.  To  bring this  out let  us
distinguish between  the satisfaction and  the pacification of  a desire, as
follows.  A desire  is  satisfied  just  if its  conditions of  satisfaction
obtain,  and in  particular  if it  operates to  secure these  in successful
action; and a desire  is pacified if it is caused to cease to operate, or to
alter  in  its  operation,   in  certain  normal  ways.  In  terms  of  this
distinction,  we can  say  that in  the everyday  explanation of  action, we
assume  that  satisfaction characteristically  causes  pacification, and  at
least partly  by way of belief.  Thus Freud desires that  he drink, and as a
result he  drinks, so that his desire is satisfied;  and as a further result
he believes  that he has drunk,  and this belief, perhaps  together with the
drink itself, pacifies his  desire to drink, so that it ceases to govern his
actions.  In   wishfulfilment,  by   contrast,  we  take   desire  to  cause
satisfaction-like  experience and  quasi-belief  directly, and  so to  yield
pacification  without satisfaction. Thus  Freud desires  to drink, and  as a
result  dreams that  he is  drinking, and  this, as  it seems,  pacifies his
desire, at least temporarily.
The phenomenon of pacification as distinct from satisfaction plays a salient
role  in  interpretive practice.  One  of  our principal  ways of  verifying
hypotheses about  the desires upon which  we presume people to  be acting is
through observing that they cease to act as on a particular desire precisely
when that desire should be pacified -- that is, when the relevant conditions
of  satisfaction  obtain,  and  the agents  become  aware of  this. We  thus
implicitly interpret action by reference to the content of pacifying belief,
just as  we explicitly interpret wishfulfilment  by reference to the content
of  pacifying quasi-belief;  and  interpretation in  both cases  consists in
taking the  believed content  as derived from  a desire which  the action or
wishfulfilment serves to pacify. In light of the phenomenon of pacification,
we must  note that  action and representation  are fundamentally interwoven;
action  and  phantasy  are   both  aimed  at  the  production  of  pacifying
representation, and interpreted by reference to the content of this.
Taking  pacification   explicitly  into   account,  we  can   say  that  our
understanding of  the causal pattern in  even the simplest successful action
involves a fuller pattern than that which appears in (3), which we can write
as:
(3)*  A's  desire  that  P  -[causes]->  P  -[causes]-> A's  belief  that  P
-[causes]-> A's desire that P is pacified
As  before, this  can serve  as a  predictive pattern,  in which we  frame a
hypothesis by  the use of the sentence which  describes the desire, and test
this hypothesis  by further uses of that  same sentence, to characterize not
only  the action  or situation  which the  desire brings  about, but  also a
belief which  the agent forms as a result of  this, and the consequent inner
process, in which the  belief causes the initial desire to cease to operate.
(This cycle, again, is  found in other forms of teleological explanation, in
which a  representation causes  a system to  attain a goal and  this in turn
causes  a further  representation  which operates  to curtail  or  alter the
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activity of  the first.)  In the case  of human motive  the pattern includes
within  that of  veridical belief, specified  in (4)  above; and in  this it
particularly contrasts  with wishfulfilment. (1) can  likewise be filled out
to
(1)* A's  desire that P -[causes]-> A's b-rep  that P -[causes]-> A's desire
that P is pacified.
This  makes  it  clear  that we  can  regard  wishfulfilment  as  a kind  of
short-circuiting  of  a  path  from desire  through  reality  to belief  and
pacification  which  is  at  every  step  rational,  and which  we  find  in
successful action.  For we can see  (1)* as obtained from  (3)* precisely by
the omission  from the  latter of the  causal role of the  situation that P,
which is real and satisfying, and causation by which distinguishes veridical
belief from  belief-like representation. This emerges  again if we note that
(3)*  is  cast  in  terms  of  belief,  and  (1)* in  terms  of  belief-like
representation.  Since  belief  can  be  treated  as the  limiting  case  of
belief-like representation, we can rewrite (3)* in a more general form as
(3)**  A's  desire  that  P  -[causes]->  P  -[causes]-> A's  b-rep  that  P
-[causes]-> A's desire that P is pacified
Again, omitting  the causal role of  the real situation that  P yields (1)*,
the pattern of pacifying wishfulfilment.
It thus appears that  contrary to Johnston's statement above an interpretive
view  of  the mind  --  even one  which  places particular  emphasis on  the
'pattern  of reason-explanations' --  need have  no difficulty in  finding a
place for the pattern  relating desire to quasi-belief. For both this latter
pattern  and that  relating  desire to  satisfaction now  appear  as partial
sub-patterns  in  the  overarching  and  representation-mediated  connection
between desire  and pacification which is  characteristic of rational action
itself.
In this perspective the interpretation of rational action and wishfulfilment
are naturally  interrelated. In commonsense psychology  we interpret actions
in accord with the  basic generalization that the role of a desire that P is
to produce a situation  that P, which in turn should produce a belief that P
which  (perhaps  together  with  the  situation)  pacifies  the  desire.  In
understanding  persons we  both  tacitly use  this generalization,  and also
sustain it  inductively, as  noted above. Since  this generalization already
includes the  idea that representation (belief) that  P serves to pacify the
desire  that P,  we  also take  it as  an  intelligible, and  indeed common,
phenomenon that a desire  that P should play a role in causing a belief-like
representation that  P, which tends  to pacify the desire.  This is, indeed,
another  generalization   which  we   already  both  use   and  sustain,  in
understanding  many  forms of  pacifying  representation with  which we  are
familiar. These  include a  variety of kinds  of children's play,  and adult
representations such  as those of literature,  art, cinema, and such related
achievements  as  advertising  and pornography.  We  know,  of course,  that
pacification consequent on real  satisfaction and veridical belief is, among
other  things,  more  thorough   and  lasting  than  that  obtained  through
representation or  phantasy. But  we also know  that desire far  outruns the
possibilities  of satisfying  action,  so that  attempts at  pacification by
representation alone are common.
Thus I  think we already understand, say, that  a child may represent itself
as a  hero in  play, or that  we repeatedly represent  certain situations in
fiction,  film, etc.,  because  these situations  seem desirable,  and their
representation  therefore  provides  opportunity  for  the  pacification  of
desire,  via  one  form  or  another  of  quasi-belief (cf  the  notions  of
make-believe, suspension  of disbelief,  and so forth). We  are aware, e.g.,
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that someone playing a video game in which he mutilates a variety of enemies
may not only be satisfying a desire to play a game, but also pacifying other
desires which  the game  represents as fulfilled;  and that the  arousal and
pacification of these desires may be a source of the excitement of the game.
Understanding of this commonsense kind is continuous with the psychoanalytic
interpretation of a dream or symptom. Thus compare Freud's interpretation of
the Rat  Man's recurrent symptom  of imagining his father  being punished by
the rats,  and feeling  anxiety and depression  as a result.  In accord with
(1)*  we can  see this  as expressing  a wish  that his father  be punished,
repeatedly  represented as  satisfied, and therefore  repeatedly temporarily
pacified, in  the virtual reality  of his own phantasy,  whose boundaries he
could not  keep distinct  from everyday belief.  The patterns with  which we
began  can thus be  regarded as  implicit and interwoven  in pre-theoretical
commonsense understanding  of action  and representation, and  hence also as
capable of  interacting to extend commonsense  psychology, in something like
the way indicated above.
III
Let us now turn to the division of the mind, as this appears in Davidson and
Freud.  Here,  I think,  we  encounter  what can  be  seen  as two  distinct
tendencies  of thought.  Davidson's divisions  in the self  are 'overlapping
territories' in the field of an agent's motives: they are 'constellations of
beliefs, purposes, affects' which  co-operate rationally with one another in
producing intentions; and they  can conflict with other such constellations,
or  motives in  these,  and in  this act  'in  the modality  of non-rational
causality'.  Strictly  speaking such  constellations  do not  have  motives;
rather they  are (groups or families of) motives, many  of which have a role
in more than one constellation, and all of which are had by one and the same
agent.  So they  are not really  distinct agents,  but at best  analogous to
these. Davidson  stresses explicitly that  'The analogy does not  have to be
carried  so  far  as  to demand  that  we  speak of  parts  of  the mind  as
independent agents...the  idea of quasi-autonomous division  is not one that
demands a  little agent in the division.' His idea thus  seems to be to stop
short of  the postulation of homunculi, and make  do with cohesive groups of
motives  instead.  And  it  is  difficult  to  see how  the  explanation  of
irrationality  might proceed without  reference to  such groups in  any case
(how, for  example, might the wish  not to know cause  one to avoid relevant
evidence, except via the web of belief?)
Freud's ego,  super-ego, and id,  by contrast, can certainly  be regarded as
distinct  and autonomous 'agencies'.  Insofar as  this is so,  however, they
seem  not  best  thought  of as  agents  which  have  desires, beliefs,  and
practical reason,  but rather as functional systems,  which we describe in a
teleological  way, that  is, in  terms of  the goals  which we take  them to
operate to secure, and  the information they use in doing so. This seems the
way  to  interpret,  e.g.  Freud's description  of  the  ego  as 'a  special
organization...  which  acts  as  an intermediary  between  the  id and  the
external  world',  and  which   also  'makes  far-reaching  changes  in  its
organization'  in  the state  of  sleep;  or again  his  description of  the
super-ego as 'a special agency [in the ego] in which...parental influence is
prolonged'  (XXIII,  145,146).  Teleological  description of  this  kind  is
closely related  to that in terms  of beliefs and desires;  but the two have
differences    which    are   relevant    to    the   present    discussion.
As noted above, when  we describe people in terms of desires and beliefs, we
can also be regarded  as indirectly be describing a neural system (the human
brain) in  a teleological  way, in terms  of the environmental  goals of the
system  and  information  upon  which  it  operates. In  this,  however,  we
represent the goals and  information in terms of human language, and thereby
imply  that  the system  (person)  we  are describing  represents goals  and
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information  in a  comparably subtle  and powerful  way. We  take it  that a
person to whom we  ascribe a desire for Scotch Whiskey, for example, has the
concept  of Scotch  Whiskey,  and therefore  has many  beliefs  about Scotch
Whiskey and  can readily  compute many more  (cf xii); and  we make constant
tacit  use of  this in  interpretation, for  example in our  applications of
logical principles  such as (5). Where  we give teleological explanations of
the behaviour of animals  and artifacts, however, we relax this implication.
Thus we  take it that a  rat whose goal is  to get Scotch Whiskey  -- say by
pressing  a bar  -- has  some representation  of this outcome,  otherwise we
would  not acribe  this goal.  But we  do not  assume that  the rat  has our
representation of Scotch Whiskey,  and so we do not regard the ascription of
the goal as having the same consequences as in the case of a person.
The point  is the  same in the  case of the  ego, super-ego, and  id. We may
describe such systems as if they had motives, in describing their goals, and
information  on which  we take  them to  operate; but  we do not  take these
descriptions to have the same consequences as in the case of the desires and
beliefs of persons. And since the motives of persons are the basic paradigms
of  desire  and  belief,  we might  do  better  to  follow Wittgenstein  and
Davidson,  and  say  that  in such  non-paradigmatic  uses  the animals  (or
artifacts, or systems of  neurons) do not have desires and beliefs, although
they may embody representations which operate in a similar way.
The situation  is particularly complicated in  the case of Freud's agencies.
For while  the ego and super-ego  are clearly meant to  be functional neural
systems,  teleologically described,  these  systems are  also understood  as
embodying neural prototypes derived  from actual persons in the environment.
Freud's mode of explanation combines the idea of functional systems with the
observation  that  the  way  persons  actually  function  depends  upon  the
prototypes by  means of which they  represent themselves and their relations
to others. The ego thus embodies the prototypes which the child forms of the
parents in their role as agents acting to satisfy desires, and the super-ego
still  earlier and  cruder  prototypes ('the  earliest parental  imagos') of
regulating and  controlling figures,  laid down in relation  to the infant's
own  basic  impulses,  such  as those  to  eat  and  defecate, and  severely
distorted  by  early  emotion  and  projection. Hence  Freud  describes  the
operation of  these systems in terms of the  motives of the basic prototypes
which the  systems embody.  The super-ego is thus,  e.g., 'an agency...which
observes and  threatens to  punish' and which  in some cases  of disturbance
becomes  'sharply  divided  from [the]  ego  and  mistakenly displaced  into
external reality.' (XXXI, 59, 64)
Such  descriptions  are  likely  to seem  at  once  mistakenly abstract  and
anthropomorphic; but  in fact they serve  relatively precisely to generalize
over clinical data. Take again the example of the Rat Man's cowering in fear
of  punishment  from  Freud,  while recovering  memories  of  his father  as
actually punishing him, and  seeming just such a terrifying figure as he had
been taking  Freud to be (xxxiii  - xxxvi). This is  one of many cases which
fits  Freud's description  above:  a part  of  the ego,  which observes  and
threatens to  punish, is  here seen to  be split off and  displaced into the
external world (in this  case into the figure of the analyst.) This part, in
turn,  is  apparently related  to  a  distorted prototype  of the  patient's
punishing father,  as was emerging in conscious  memory. And there is reason
to suppose  that the activation of  a similar prototype --  in the encounter
with the Captain who told him of the rat torture, and who really was fond of
cruelty and  physical punishment  -- served to percipitate  his breakdown in
the first place.
So Freud  and Davidson divide  the self in different  ways. Freud postulates
partly distinct agencies which  we describe in terms of figures with desires
and  beliefs,  but  which  are  ascribed  these  in  what  is  ultimately  a
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metaphorical way; and Davidson  postulates partly distinct groups of desires
and  beliefs, which  we  may describe  as agents,  but  only metaphorically.
Johnston, by contrast, discusses  the same topic in terms of the postulation
of 'primary  homunculi', which are  real agents, with real  motives (see his
footnote 25).  These are,  therefore, clearly  not the same  as Freud's real
agencies with  only metaphorical  motives, or Davidson's  real motives which
are only  metaphorical agents.  (Johnston also considers  explanations which
take  'the intentional  stance'  to things  like plants,  but these  are not
representation-ascribing teleological explanations at all.)
Since  Johnston's  criticisms  are  directed  at a  conception  of  division
distinct from  that of both Freud and Davidson,  they apply to neither. This
is clear  from Johnston's own  account of his critique.  After describing 'a
homuncularism  which  solves all  the  paradoxes of  self-deception we  have
encountered' Johnston urges that
               This account  can be discredited  so long as we  do not allow
               its advocates the  luxury of hovering non-committally between
               the  horns of  a dilemma:  either take the  subsystem account
               literally,  in  which  case  it  implausibly  represents  the
               ordinary  self-deceiver  as  a  victim of  something  like  a
               multiple personality, or take it as a metaphor, in which case
               it provides  no way to evade  the paradoxes while maintaining
               that intentional acts constitute self-deception... (82)
Johnston's  arguments enlarge on  this claim,  and also enforce  his earlier
remarks at  pp 64-5 about the  'puzzles' inherent in homuncular explanation.
But while an account  of division in terms of 'primary homunculi' might well
be impaled  on this dilemma, those of Freud  and Davidson clearly avoid both
horns,  and in  different  ways; so  neither  is in  the least  discredited.
Freud's  distinct  systems constitute  one  person,  and the  way these  are
ascribed   motives,   although   metaphorical,   is  nonetheless   genuinely
explanatory, as far as  it goes. Davidson's 'constellations' contain genuine
motives, which  serve to explain  in the usual intentional  way, except that
their working is in some respects abridged; and they are not distinct agents
at all. So in neither case is there a threat of multiple personality, nor of
the  substitution  for  intentional  explanation of  unacceptable  metaphor.
Davidson  can  avoid the  paradoxes  by  reference to  cohesive motives  and
intentional acts,  and Freud by  reference to agencies and  their goals; and
these  kinds  of explanation  are  coherent,  both internally  and with  one
another.
We can make this clearer by starting with Davidson's account of akrasia, and
moving from  it towards  the kind of  description in terms  of the super-ego
which  we have  already  considered. Davidson  gives the  following example,
taken   from   a  note   in   Freud's   case  history   of   the  Rat   Man:
               A man  walking in  a park stumbles  on a branch  in the path.
               Thinking the  branch may endanger others,  he picks it up and
               throws  it in  a hedge beside  the path.  On his way  home it
               occurs to him that he branch may be projecting from the hedge
               and so still bge  a threat to unwary walkers. He gets off the
               tram he  is on, returns to the  park, and restores the branch
               to its  original position...It  is easy to  imagine that [he]
               realizes that his action is not sensible. He has a motive for
               removing the stick, namely  that it may endanger a passer-by.
               But he also has a motive for not returning, which is the time
               and  trouble  it  costs.  In  his own  judgment,  the  latter
               consideration  outweighs  the  former;  yet he  acts  on  the
               former. In short, he goes against his own best judgment.
Davidson explains  how this  example fits his  account of akrasia,  and also
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indicates how  it might be  deepened, through exploring his  conception of a
divided mind.
               ...Recall  the  analysis of  akrasia.  There  I mentioned  no
               partitioning  of the  mind because  the analysis was  at that
               point more descriptive than explanatory. But the way would be
               cleared  for  explanation  if  we  were  to  to  suppose  two
               semi-autonomous  departments of  the mind,  one that  finds a
               certain course of action  to be, all things considered, best,
               and another  that prompts  another course of  action. On each
               side, the side of  sober judgment and the side of incontinent
               intent  and  action,  there  is  a  supporting  structure  of
               reasons, of  interlocking beliefs, expectations, assumptions,
               attitudes and desires. To set the scene this way still leaves
               much  unexplained,  for  we  want  to know  why  this  double
               structue developed, how it accounts for the action taken, and
               also,  no doubt,  its psychic  consequences and cure.  What I
               stress  here is  that the  partitioned mind leaves  the field
               open to such further explanations...
To think about further  explanations it will be useful to replace Davidson's
example  from Freud  with another  to which  it is  closely related.  In the
original  example it  was plain that  the branch  was more dangerous  in its
original position, so that  the incontinent intent was also hostile. In this
Freud  took  the example  to  be  similar to  many  from the  Rat Man's  own
behaviour. Thus once when his lady was leaving,
               [The Rat  Man] found a stone  lying in the roadway  and had a
               phantasy that  her carriage  might hit up against  it and she
               might come to grief.  He therefore put it out of the way, but
               twenty minutes later it  occurred to him that this was absurd
               and  he  went back  in  order  to replace  the  stone it  its
               position. (X 307)
It is  easy to imagine that  the Rat Man also thought  it would be best, all
things considered, to let the stone remain in the safe place to which he had
moved it, so that  his action in moving it again was akratic. Here, however,
we  know something  further  about 'two  semi-autonomous departments  of the
mind' each  with many  co-operating motives, one  of which was  for, and the
other against, the akratic  act. The Rat Man's attitude towards his lady was
marked by the same deep ambivalence and conflict as that towards his father,
as shown  in the  fact that he also  frequently wished the rats  on her, and
suffered as a result  -- particularly, it seems, when she vexed him by doing
things like  going away  from him, as in  the example above. On  the side of
moving the stone again, then, were arrayed a group of motives hostile to the
lady, and  shown also in the original phantasy that  she might come to grief
on it;  while good sense  (as well, perhaps, as  the constellation involving
the desire  to protect  her in accord  with which he first  moved the stone)
would council letting it lie, in its safe new place.
The Rat Man was often ready to acknowledge his 'vindictive impulses' (X 185)
toward his  lady, so the episode  as described might not  have involved even
ordinary self-deception.  Still we can easily imagine  that it did, and that
this can  be explained in Davidson's way. Suppose,  having told Freud of the
episode, the Rat Man  had tried to explain his bothering to return -- to put
the rock  in what  had originally struck  him as a dangerous  position -- by
saying 'I  did it to adhere  to the ideal of  rationality.' There might be a
good  deal  behind this:  as  he walked  along  the road,  say, he  muttered
rhythmically to  himself 'I must  be rational, I shall  be rational, I shall
leave things as they were.' And acting rationally, we might suppose, was one
of his ideals, and one he took Freud and himself to share, but which he knew
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he often fell short of.
We  can  imagine that  this  made  him more  comfortable,  but  that it  was
self-deception. For he recalls,  say, that -- although he was scarcely aware
of it, and did not think much about it at the time -- he was in fact feeling
angrier with his lady  with each step he took along the road, and hence with
each rhythmic muttering about doing what was rational; and as he walked away
he imagined  her carriage smashed to bits on the stone  he had put back, and
thought  ' That will  serve  her right,  for  having dared  to abandon  me!'
Material like this  might lead us to judge that he had  moved the stone as a
result of  an impulse to harm his lady, but that  (in accord with a cohesive
constellation of  motives aimed at) wanting to look  better in his own eyes,
he had  made himself  think that he  was doing it  to adhere to  an ideal of
rationality, and had done so partly by talking to himself.
Such  an explanation  would presuppose  that the  agent's motives  fell into
groups partly  comparable to  those of a  deceiver and a  deceived, and also
that he  was not fully aware  of their operation in  these constellations at
the time. Ascribing this lack of connecting awareness, however, would not be
treating him  as two distinct agents:  for the motives were  all his, and he
was more  or less  aware of the  thoughts and feelings  connected with their
operation,  and clearly relevant  to their  ascription, all the  time. Hence
also he  might readily acknowledge in retrospect  that he had been deceiving
himself with  his talk of rationality, and  that this had involved something
like the  'flight from anxiety' which Johnston  emphasizes (85); and in this
he might  also appreciate that the  'protective' constellation of motives on
which he had acted in stressing rationality was a natural concomitant of his
ambivalence,  which required  him to  be more  or less  unaware of  his real
motives so as to  act in accord with his hatred without suffering guilt. And
we  might know,  and  he might  be able  to  acknowledge, that  in deceiving
himself in  this way he had chosen his means well,  because he knew his man:
the line  he fed  himself worked because  it was flattering, and  it was one
which he could be depended on to fall for.
Some divided constellations of  motives thus are, or might be, clear enough;
and these might serve  to explain instances of akrasia and self-deception in
considerable detail. Still, as  Davidson says, this leaves much unexplained:
for we want to  know about the causes of these divisions, and where relevant
their cure. This is what Freud's account tells us. Division or fragmentation
in the  self goes with division or  fragmentation in (the representation of)
those  to whom  the self  has been  most fundamentally related.  The 'double
structure' to  which Davidson  refers can be  a structure of  love and hate,
ultimately  built around  disparate 'imagos'  or prototypes of  the parents,
which were  the earliest  objects of these  emotions, and hence  the objects
towards which they were  directed in their most primitive forms. These early
prototypes remain  active in us, and  shape our representations of ourselves
and of  subsequent objects of  thought and feeling, and  so partly determine
the thoughts and feelings themselves. In this they contribute to the forming
of what Freud called  the ego and super-ego. Thus the image of a prohibiting
and  punitive father  can both  cause a  rebellious and resentful  desire to
punish that father in return, and also be incorporated in a conscience whose
punitive severity renders its  possessor liable to suicidal depression. Such
images can  emerge in analysis, as indicated  in the introduction, and hence
be modified by further  experience and thought. Still, the altering of basic
psychic prototypes  is a far more difficult  matter than unravelling a piece
of  self-deception. In  particular, such  change requires what  Freud called
working through,  and this can be a  time-consuming process; but the psychic
consequences are accordingly more far reaching.
The understanding  of such  early prototypes, and  hence of division  in the
mind more generally, was  significantly advanced by the work of analysts who
file:///Macintosh%20HD/Desktop%20Folder/irrationality (15 of 16) [30/4/2004 11:48:40 am]
file:///Macintosh%20HD/Desktop%20Folder/irrationality
followed Freud,  and in particular by Melanie Klein.  She was able to extend
Freud's methods  to the  analysis of even  very young children,  by allowing
them free  and unhibited play as well as  free association; and she observed
that in  these conditions children  not only played out  the satisfaction of
the childhood  desires which Freud had  hypothesized, but also others, which
were  more  extreme, and  which  allowed her  to  extend his  theories in  a
systematic way  (cf footnotes 27,29, and 22  in the introduction). She found
that very  disparate images  of the parents,  and hence of  the self, seemed
operative in  disturbed children from  early in life; and  that the earliest
prototypes, which  lay at the root of all  others, were the most fragmented,
incoherent,  and extreme of  all. Hence  she hypothesized that  the original
conflict-engendering images were laid down in early infancy, before the baby
developed a  working grasp of the concept of  identity. The infant liable to
violent emotion and excessive projection could not, in Hume's phrase, 'unite
the broken  appearances' of the parents,  by synthesizing them into coherent
wholes; and this incoherence  was reflected back in its infantile experience
and image  of itself. Thus on Klein's account  a fundamental task of infancy
is that  of integrating our experience, including  that of persons, by means
of  the  concept  of  an  enduring and  spatio-temporally  coherent  object.
Psychoanalysis  traces divisions in  the self  to failures in  this original
synthesis, and so provides an explanation of the 'double structure' which is
both conceptually  and empirically  deep. And in  the case of  the self, the
understanding  of the  broken images  which are  the causes of  its division
tends also to knit these images together, and so to provide the means of its
cure.
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